

**From:** ToTheMars ABC <[abctothemars@gmail.com](mailto:abctothemars@gmail.com)> via [pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)  
**To:** pqc-forum <[pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)>  
**Subject:** [pqc-forum] Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?  
**Date:** Wednesday, June 08, 2022 01:34:45 PM ET

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After the introduction of NSM8, everyone should pay attention to the post-quantum signature algorithm. Compared with the major signature algorithms of NIST PQC, only the rainbow signature algorithm is most suitable for decentralized cryptocurrencies. At the same time, the rainbow signature algorithm is based on NP problem, which is mathematically unsolvable, so it is still safe

#### 1 The 8th《National Security Memorandum》

NSM8 from the White House of U.S. , launched on January 19th, 2022 which clearly require all agencies of the U.S. to finish something specially in quantum-resistance algorithms , shows it will be the beginning of a new world of quantum resistance times. All cryptos , bitcoin include, will have to upgrade its digital signature algorithm vulnerable to quantum computer to quantum-resistance digital signature algorithms:

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/01/19/memorandum-on-improving-the-cybersecurity-of-national-security-department-of-defense-and-intelligence-community-systems/>

NSM8 said :

(B) Within 60 days of the date of this memorandum, the NSA shall revise and make available to Chief Information Officers the CNSS Advisory Memorandum 01-07 (Information Assurance Cryptographic Equipment Modernization) and any associated enclosures and relevant references regarding modernization planning, use of unsupported encryption, approved mission unique protocols, quantum resistant protocols, and planning for use of quantum resistant cryptography where necessary.

and more :

#### 2 NISTPQC

National Institute of Standards & Technology, NIST, have prepared to be able to resist quantum computing via its NISTPQC project.

So far there're 3 kinds of digital signatures, from NIST, will be probably quantum-resistant.

1st: Hash-based signatures:

XMSS, LMS:

<https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/stateful-hash-based-signatures>

Sphincs+ and Picnic:

<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/Round-3-Submissions>

WOTS+:

[https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/wots\\_plus](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/wots_plus)

RESCUE for StarkWare and Ethereum:

<https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/820.pdf>

2nd: Lattice:

Falcon & Dilithium :

<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/Round-3-Submissions>

3rd: Multivariate:

Rainbow Signature:

<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/Round-3-Submissions>

1. Weak points for above 3 kinds of digital signatures:

1st: hash-based signature:

«State management of Hash-based signatures»

<https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/357.pdf>

2nd: Lattice-based:

«Non-randomness of S-unit lattices»

<https://cr.yp.to/papers/spherical-20211023.pdf>

«Report on the Security of LWE: Improved Dual Lattice Attack»

<https://zenodo.org/record/6412487>

3rd: Multivariate:

«Breaking Rainbow Takes a Weekend on a Laptop»

<https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/214>

Given strict requirements of "long-term secure, stable, smaller signature size and actually using cases" for those special cryptocurrencies and blockchain scenarios. the conclusion is that Multivariate is PROBABLY ONLY BEST suitable for.

Especially Rainbow Signature:

<https://www.pqcrairbow.org/>

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**From:** Mike Ounsworth <[mike.ounsworth@entrust.com](mailto:mike.ounsworth@entrust.com)> via pqc-forum <[pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)>  
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**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL] [pqc-forum] Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?  
**Date:** Wednesday, June 08, 2022 02:19:39 PM ET

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I'm confused, you say that "Breaking Rainbow Takes a Weekend on a Laptop", and then conclude that Rainbow is best. That does not seem to line up.

—  
Mike Ounsworth  
Software Security Architect, Entrust

From: pqc-forum@list.nist.gov <pqc-forum@list.nist.gov> On Behalf Of ToTheMars ABC  
Sent: June 8, 2022 12:34 PM  
To: pqc-forum <pqc-forum@list.nist.gov>  
Subject: [EXTERNAL] [pqc-forum] Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?

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RESCUE for StarkWare and Ethereum:

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2nd: Lattice:

Falcon & Dilithium:

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3rd: Multivariate:

Rainbow Signature:

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1. Weak points for above 3 kinds of digital signatures:

1st: hash-based signature:

《State management of Hash-based signatures》

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2nd: Lattice-based:

《Non-randomness of S-unit lattices》

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[Yfy2pM3rSs5hyBZN9V3WpkNU95Iv-6B600Dd21D0ztNYwgpJnnb0ZzTy1NJ8kaaa5B1SVJ0q\\_5xatqJDRvCZLYzV0QI%24&data=05%7C01%7Candrew.regenscheid%40nist.gov%7Cd7cb77f4e1cb4d90eac308da497b722e%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61dec%7C1%7C0%7C637903091796116958%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Iik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=qhXthvYg%2Fa5Bem%2Bi9%2F62INGyAfNwWni%2F1C5YnakA5gY%3D&reserved=0](https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Furldefense.com%2Fv%3F__https%3A%2F%2Fcr.yp.to%2Fpapers%2Fspherical-20211023.pdf__%3B!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!Yfy2pM3rSs5hyBZN9V3WpkNU95Iv-6B600Dd21D0ztNYwgpJnnb0ZzTy1NJ8kaaa5B1SVJ0q_5xatqJDRvCZLYzV0QI%24&data=05%7C01%7Candrew.regenscheid%40nist.gov%7Cd7cb77f4e1cb4d90eac308da497b722e%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61dec%7C1%7C0%7C637903091796116958%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Iik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=qhXthvYg%2Fa5Bem%2Bi9%2F62INGyAfNwWni%2F1C5YnakA5gY%3D&reserved=0)

《Report on the Security of LWE: Improved Dual Lattice Attack》

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3rd: Multivariate:

«Breaking Rainbow Takes a Weekend on a Laptop»

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Given strict requirements of "long-term secure, stable, smaller signature size and actually using cases" for those special cryptocurrencies and blockchain scenarios. the conclusion is that Multivariate is PROBABLY ONLY BEST suitable for.

Especially Rainbow Signature:

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**CC:** abctot...@gmail.com <[abctothemars@gmail.com](mailto:abctothemars@gmail.com)>  
**Subject:** [pqc-forum] Re: Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?  
**Date:** Thursday, June 09, 2022 09:29:43 PM ET

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This sounds very much just like another poor attempt at doing marketing for the ABC Mint cryptocurrency <https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5103397.0>

Best regards

On Thursday, June 9, 2022 at 2:33:52 AM UTC+9 abctot...@gmail.com wrote:

After the introduction of NSM8, everyone should pay attention to the post-quantum signature algorithm. Compared with the major signature algorithms of NIST PQC, only the rainbow signature algorithm is most suitable for decentralized cryptocurrencies. At the same time, the rainbow signature algorithm is based on NP problem, which is mathematically unsolvable, so it is still safe

1 The 8th《National Security Memorandum》

NSM8 from the White House of U.S. , launched on January 19th, 2022 which clearly require all agencies of the U.S. to finish something specially in quantum-resistance algorithms , shows it will be the beginning of a new world of quantum resistance times. All cryptos , bitcoin include, will have to upgrade its digital signature algorithm vulnerable to quantum computer to quantum-resistance digital signature algorithms:

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/01/19/memorandum-on-improving-the-cybersecurity-of-national-security-department-of-defense-and-intelligence-community-systems/>

NSM8 said :

(B) Within 60 days of the date of this memorandum, the NSA shall revise and make available to Chief Information Officers the CNSS Advisory Memorandum 01-07 (Information Assurance Cryptographic Equipment Modernization) and any associated enclosures and relevant references regarding modernization planning, use of unsupported encryption, approved mission unique protocols, quantum resistant protocols, and planning for use of quantum resistant cryptography where necessary.

and more :

2 NISTPQC

National Institute of Standards & Technology, NIST, have prepared to be able to resist quantum computing via its NISTPQC project.

So far there're 3 kinds of digital signatures, from NIST, will be probably quantum-resistant.

1st: Hash-based signatures:

XMSS, LMS:

<https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/stateful-hash-based-signatures>

Sphincs+ and Picnic:

<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/Round-3-Submissions>

WOTS+:

[https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/wots\\_plus](https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/wots_plus)

RESCUE for StarkWare and Ethereum:

<https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/820.pdf>

2nd: Lattice:

Falcon & Dilithium :

<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/Round-3-Submissions>

3rd: Multivariate:

Rainbow Signature:

<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/Round-3-Submissions>

1. Weak points for above 3 kinds of digital signatures:

1st: hash-based signature:

«State management of Hash-based signatures»

<https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/357.pdf>

2nd: Lattice-based:

«Non-randomness of S-unit lattices»

<https://cr.yp.to/papers/spherical-20211023.pdf>

«Report on the Security of LWE: Improved Dual Lattice Attack»

<https://zenodo.org/record/6412487>

3rd: Multivariate:

«Breaking Rainbow Takes a Weekend on a Laptop»

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**From:** ToTheMars ABC <[abctothemars@gmail.com](mailto:abctothemars@gmail.com)> via [pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)  
**To:** pqc-forum <[pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)>  
**CC:** jms.mon...@gmail.com <[jms.monitoring@gmail.com](mailto:jms.monitoring@gmail.com)>, ToTheMars ABC <[abctothemars@gmail.com](mailto:abctothemars@gmail.com)>  
**Subject:** [pqc-forum] Re: Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?  
**Date:** Saturday, June 11, 2022 09:30:39 AM ET

---

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This sounds very much just like another poor attempt at doing marketing for the ABC Mint cryptocurrency <https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5103397.0>

Best regards

On Thursday, June 9, 2022 at 2:33:52 AM UTC+9 [abctot...@gmail.com](mailto:abctot...@gmail.com) wrote:

After the introduction of NSM8, everyone should pay attention to the post-quantum signature algorithm. Compared with the major signature algorithms of NIST PQC, only the rainbow signature algorithm is most suitable for decentralized cryptocurrencies. At the same time, the rainbow signature algorithm is based on NP problem, which is mathematically unsolvable, so it is still safe

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**Subject:** [pqc-forum] Re: Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?  
**Date:** Sunday, June 12, 2022 01:47:58 AM ET

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**CC:** abctot...@gmail.com <[abctothemars@gmail.com](mailto:abctothemars@gmail.com)>, jms.mon...@gmail.com <[jms.monitoring@gmail.com](mailto:jms.monitoring@gmail.com)>  
**Subject:** [ppc-forum] Re: Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?  
**Date:** Sunday, June 12, 2022 08:23:39 PM ET

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**Subject:** [pqc-forum] Re: Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?  
**Date:** Monday, July 04, 2022 06:05:39 AM ET

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In response to your comment that "rainbow algorithm have also been cracked"  
Abc Chairman Liu Jin has said "Anyone who cracks Abc's rainbow signature will be awarded a \$400,000 bonus", have you heard of anyone getting it so far?

Also you mentioned "the code base of Abc has not been maintained for 4 years".  
Mr. Liu Jin has said many times that their project is recognized by many cryptographers as stable and secure, so why does a secure and stable project need to be maintained? Could it be that you found the vulnerability of abc?

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I don't understand why you say you can't contact the team, whether it's the rainbow signature practice team, or the abc team, many people are contacted, for example, Mr. Liu Jin and Ruben Niederhagen of the abc team, or Professor Bo-Yin Yang of the rainbow signature team can be contacted.

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Mr. Liu said, "The falcon algorithm is a very controversial algorithm, which is suspected to be related to a plagiarist, and the algorithm is not secure." Is it reliable that Tidecoin uses an

insecure and controversial algorithm?

Finally, if you want to learn more about pqc, you can follow Mr. Liu Jin on twitter: <https://twitter.com/amisrepresented>

andy yi <hy8196695@gmail.com> 于2022年6月12日周日 05:47写道：

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**Subject:** [pqc-forum] Re: Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?  
**Date:** Monday, July 04, 2022 06:13:46 AM ET

---

Mr. Liu Jin predicts that in the next few decades, the only truly usable digital signature solution that can resist quantum computer cracking is the rainbow signature.

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**Subject:** Re: [pqc-forum] Re: Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?  
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---

On 04/07/2022 18:05, ToTheMars ABC wrote:

> ABC Foundation member Ruben Niederhagen: <https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fpolycephaly.org%2F&data=05%7C01%7Cyi-kai.liu%40nist.gov%7C59879da0e360436dc7f808da5db6e87c%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61dec%7C1%7C0%7C637925337435315370%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=YaUjSR%2FzPCeyC%2F0P%2FQvHLDuSFEfH%2FYKIf9lHhMIcciI%3D&reserved=0>

Just for the record: I am not member of the ABC Foundation and I am also not affiliated with any other cryptocurrency.

Best regards

Ruben

--

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**From:** ToTheMars ABC <[abctothemars@gmail.com](mailto:abctothemars@gmail.com)> via [pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)  
**To:** pqc-forum <[pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)>  
**CC:** Ruben Niederhagen <[ruben@polycephaly.org](mailto:ruben@polycephaly.org)>, ToTheMars ABC <[abctothemars@gmail.com](mailto:abctothemars@gmail.com)>  
**Subject:** Re: [pqc-forum] Re: Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?  
**Date:** Monday, July 04, 2022 10:56:15 AM ET

---

I'm sorry, but the chairman of the ABC Foundation has mentioned your relationship with him many times, and some people in the ABC community have contacted you, so everyone in the ABC community has mistaken you for a member of the ABC Foundation.

在2022年7月4日星期一 UTC 12:15:12<Ruben Niederhagen> 写道：

On 04/07/2022 18:05, ToTheMars ABC wrote:

> ABC Foundation member Ruben Niederhagen: <http://polycephaly.org>

Just for the record: I am not member of the ABC Foundation and I am also not affiliated with any other cryptocurrency.

Best regards

Ruben

--

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**From:** Matthias Kannwischer <[m.kannwischer@gmail.com](mailto:m.kannwischer@gmail.com)> via [pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)  
**To:** ToTheMars ABC <[abctothemars@gmail.com](mailto:abctothemars@gmail.com)>, pqc-forum <[pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)>  
**CC:** Lorenz Panny <[lorenz@yx7.cc](mailto:lorenz@yx7.cc)>  
**Subject:** Re: [pqc-forum] Re: Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?  
**Date:** Thursday, July 07, 2022 03:08:13 AM ET

---

Dear ToTheMars ABC, dear all,

On Mon, 4 Jul 2022 at 18:05, ToTheMars ABC <[abctothemars@gmail.com](mailto:abctothemars@gmail.com)> wrote:

In response to your comment that "rainbow algorithm have also been cracked"  
Abc Chairman Liu Jin has said "Anyone who cracks Abc's rainbow signature will be awarded  
a \$400,000 bonus", have you heard of anyone getting it so far?  
as has been pointed out before, the level-1 parameter sets of Rainbow are practically broken  
by <https://ia.cr/2022/214>.  
This obviously also applies to the Rainbow(16,32,32,32) instance used in Abcmint.

We have successfully recovered the secret key corresponding to the public key with address  
84cjs07keg6SHW4vbNVbXccimCZrz7WoESXTtw12b5UsWqmm5.  
This address is one of the wealthiest on the chain with a balance of 9M ABC. There is only one  
address with a higher balance, but as it has no outgoing transactions, we don't know the  
public key.

The private key was recovered within a few hours of wall-clock time using a slightly tweaked  
version of Ward Beullens' attack software (which in turn makes use of Ruben Niederhagen's  
XL implementation).

The forged signature for the message

"There is no pot of gold at the end of the Rainbow." (ASCII)

is

"TqERiKoFpkDEOEUGrq2WfH/

XvTxP8dzbUxUpD1UyTUyLnVUaZcqW9IV+bTLluamWS+XVKFcslyHLnxNcjcnCA==" (Base64)

The Abcmint client does offer functionality to verify signatures like these, but the feature was  
apparently implemented incorrectly and only allows verifying messages signed with a private  
key in the user's own wallet. Thus, we instead publish code to verify this signature using the  
Abcmint codebase as well as our own Sage script:

<https://github.com/mkannwischer/breaking-abc>

We hope this clears up any remaining doubts about the applicability of the attack to the Abcmint blockchain. Please inform us how to collect the promised \$400,000.

Cheers,  
Lorenz and Matthias

--

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**From:** andy yi <[hy8196695@gmail.com](mailto:hy8196695@gmail.com)> via [pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)  
**To:** pqc-forum <[pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)>  
**CC:** Matthias Kannwischer <[m.kannwischer@gmail.com](mailto:m.kannwischer@gmail.com)>, Lorenz Panny <[lorenz@yx7.cc](mailto:lorenz@yx7.cc)>, abctot...@gmail.com <[abctothemars@gmail.com](mailto:abctothemars@gmail.com)>  
**Subject:** Re: [pqc-forum] Re: Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?  
**Date:** Thursday, July 07, 2022 05:39:51 AM ET

---

Today may be a historic day. This is the first time in the history of cryptocurrency that a cryptocurrency has been cracked because of its encryption algorithm. I think this is also a preview of Q-Day, so I hope that abc can be upgraded as soon as possible.

在2022年7月7日星期四 UTC+8 15:08:03<Matthias Kannwischer> 写道：

Dear ToTheMars ABC, dear all,

On Mon, 4 Jul 2022 at 18:05, ToTheMars ABC <[abctot...@gmail.com](mailto:abctot...@gmail.com)> wrote:

In response to your comment that "rainbow algorithm have also been cracked"  
Abc Chairman Liu Jin has said "Anyone who cracks Abc's rainbow signature will be awarded a \$400,000 bonus", have you heard of anyone getting it so far?

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This obviously also applies to the Rainbow(16,32,32,32) instance used in Abcmint.

We have successfully recovered the secret key corresponding to the public key with address 84cjso7keg6SHW4vbNVbXccimCZrz7WoESXTtw12b5UsWqmm5.

This address is one of the wealthiest on the chain with a balance of 9M ABC. There is only one address with a higher balance, but as it has no outgoing transactions, we don't know the public key.

The private key was recovered within a few hours of wall-clock time using a slightly tweaked version of Ward Beullens' attack software (which in turn makes use of Ruben Niederhagen's XL implementation).

The forged signature for the message

"There is no pot of gold at the end of the Rainbow." (ASCII)

is

"TqERiKoFpkDEOEUGrq2WfH/

XvTxP8dzbUxUpD1UyTUyLnVUaZcqW9IV+bTLluamWS+XVKFcsIYHLnxNcjcjnCA==" (Base64)

The Abcmint client does offer functionality to verify signatures like these, but the feature was apparently implemented incorrectly and only allows verifying messages signed with a private key in the user's own wallet. Thus, we instead publish code to verify this signature using the Abcmint codebase as well as our own Sage script:

<https://github.com/mkannwischer/breaking-abc>

We hope this clears up any remaining doubts about the applicability of the attack to the Abcmint blockchain. Please inform us how to collect the promised \$400,000.

Cheers,  
Lorenz and Matthias

--

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**From:** John Mattsson <[john.mattsson@ericsson.com](mailto:john.mattsson@ericsson.com)> via pqc-forum <[pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)>  
**To:** andy yi <[hy8196695@gmail.com](mailto:hy8196695@gmail.com)>, pqc-forum <[pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)>  
**CC:** Matthias Kannwischer <[m.kannwischer@gmail.com](mailto:m.kannwischer@gmail.com)>, Lorenz Panny <[lorenz@yx7.cc](mailto:lorenz@yx7.cc)>, abctot...@gmail.com <[abctothemars@gmail.com](mailto:abctothemars@gmail.com)>  
**Subject:** Re: [pqc-forum] Re: Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?  
**Date:** Thursday, July 07, 2022 05:56:14 AM ET

---

I think everything that need to be said about cryptocurrencies and blockchains are summarized in this recent letter to congress.

<https://concerned.tech>

NIST should publish that letter as a report and shut down this thread advertising specific cryptocurrencies.

Cheers,

John

Get [Outlook for iOS](#)

---

**From:** pqc-forum@list.nist.gov <pqc-forum@list.nist.gov> on behalf of andy yi <[hy8196695@gmail.com](mailto:hy8196695@gmail.com)>  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 7, 2022 11:39:39 AM  
**To:** pqc-forum <pqc-forum@list.nist.gov>  
**Cc:** Matthias Kannwischer <[m.kannwischer@gmail.com](mailto:m.kannwischer@gmail.com)>; Lorenz Panny <[lorenz@yx7.cc](mailto:lorenz@yx7.cc)>; abctot...@gmail.com <[abctothemars@gmail.com](mailto:abctothemars@gmail.com)>  
**Subject:** Re: [pqc-forum] Re: Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?

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Dear ToTheMars ABC, dear all,

On Mon, 4 Jul 2022 at 18:05, ToTheMars ABC <[abctot...@gmail.com](mailto:abctot...@gmail.com)> wrote:

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The forged signature for the message

"There is no pot of gold at the end of the Rainbow." (ASCII)

is

"TqERiKoFpkDEOEUGrq2WfH/

XvTxP8dzbUxUpD1UyTUyLnVUaZcqW9IV+bTLluamWS+XVKFcslyHLnxNcjcjnCA==" (Base64)

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Lorenz and Matthias

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**From:** Ruben Niederhagen <[ruben@polycephaly.org](mailto:ruben@polycephaly.org)> via [pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)  
**To:** [pqc-forum](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov) <[pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)>  
**Subject:** Re: [pqc-forum] Re: Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?  
**Date:** Thursday, July 07, 2022 05:58:38 AM ET

---

On 07/07/2022 15:07, Matthias Kannwischer wrote:

> The private key was recovered within a few hours of wall-clock time using a  
> slightly tweaked version of Ward Beullens' attack software (which in turn  
> makes use of Ruben Niederhagen's XL implementation).

The XL implementation [1] is joint work of Chen-Mou Cheng, Tung Chou,  
Ruben Niederhagen, and Bo-Yin Yang.

Best regards

Ruben

[1] Chen-Mou Cheng, Tung Chou, Ruben Niederhagen and Bo-Yin Yang:  
"Solving Quadratic Equations with XL on Parallel Architectures"  
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2012, Lecture Notes  
in Computer Science, Vol. 7428, pp. 356–373. Springer, 2012.  
[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8\\_21](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_21)

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**From:** Greg Maxwell <[gmaxwell@gmail.com](mailto:gmaxwell@gmail.com)> via [pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)  
**To:** andy yi <[hy8196695@gmail.com](mailto:hy8196695@gmail.com)>  
**CC:** pqc-forum <[pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)>, Matthias Kannwischer <[m.kannwischer@gmail.com](mailto:m.kannwischer@gmail.com)>, Lorenz Panny <[lorenz@yx7.cc](mailto:lorenz@yx7.cc)>, abctot...@gmail.com <[abctothemars@gmail.com](mailto:abctothemars@gmail.com)>  
**Subject:** Re: [pqc-forum] Re: Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?  
**Date:** Thursday, July 07, 2022 07:29:41 AM ET

---

On Thu, Jul 7, 2022 at 9:39 AM andy yi <[hy8196695@gmail.com](mailto:hy8196695@gmail.com)> wrote:

> Today may be a historic day. This is the first time in the history of cryptocurrency that a cryptocurrency has been cracked because of its encryption algorithm.

Not at all. Just to give an example, IOTA's signature scheme suffered signature forgeries. (  
<https://github.com/mit-dci/tangled-curl/blob/master/vuln-iota.md> ).  
Interestingly, that is also an example of a "post quantum" scheme that wasn't classically secure (in that case a lamport like signature constructed out of a usenet-kook-grade adhoc hash function). I can think of other signature scheme vulnerabilities in 'cryptocurrencies' too, though less applicable to this list.

It's true that most of the time cryptocurrency cryptographic flaws come from things other than the digital signature algorithm -- but that's merely a result of the fact that there are so many other things their authors can break in their quest to brew novel snake oil flavors. With so many other knobs to twiddle that they usually leave the digital signature part alone.

--

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[BRV2zSLO\\_rtYRbWcWNtCz6T%2BunXocDEuu819krQ%40mail.gmail.com](mailto:BRV2zSLO_rtYRbWcWNtCz6T%2BunXocDEuu819krQ%40mail.gmail.com).

**From:** andy yi <[hy8196695@gmail.com](mailto:hy8196695@gmail.com)> via [pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)  
**To:** pqc-forum <[pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)>  
**CC:** gmax...@gmail.com <[gmaxwell@gmail.com](mailto:gmaxwell@gmail.com)>, pqc-forum <[pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)>, Matthias Kannwischer <[m.kannwischer@gmail.com](mailto:m.kannwischer@gmail.com)>, Lorenz Panny <[lorenz@yx7.cc](mailto:lorenz@yx7.cc)>, abctot...@gmail.com <[abctothemars@gmail.com](mailto:abctothemars@gmail.com)>, andy yi <[hy8196695@gmail.com](mailto:hy8196695@gmail.com)>  
**Subject:** Re: [pqc-forum] Re: Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?  
**Date:** Thursday, July 07, 2022 08:42:39 PM ET

---

Even so, I still think it is unique, because the algorithm parameters used in abc are directly provided by Professor Ding, which is different from other cryptocurrencies. It can upgrade the parameters, etc. Rainbow team After submitting the new parameters, abc can complete the upgrade. [https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/pqc-forum/c/6bJFzU\\_h44I](https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/pqc-forum/c/6bJFzU_h44I)

在2022年7月7日星期四 UTC+8 19:29:34<[gmax...@gmail.com](mailto:gmax...@gmail.com)> 写道：

On Thu, Jul 7, 2022 at 9:39 AM andy yi <[hy81...@gmail.com](mailto:hy81...@gmail.com)> wrote:

> Today may be a historic day. This is the first time in the history of cryptocurrency that a cryptocurrency has been cracked because of its encryption algorithm.

Not at all. Just to give an example, IOTA's signature scheme suffered signature forgeries. (

<https://github.com/mit-dci/tangled-curl/blob/master/vuln-iota.md> ).

Interestingly, that is also an example of a "post quantum" scheme that wasn't classically secure (in that case a lamport like signature constructed out of a usenet-kook-grade adhoc hash function). I can think of other signature scheme vulnerabilities in 'cryptocurrencies' too, though less applicable to this list.

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**From:** [mahamadou.x.diarra@gmail.com](mailto:mahamadou.x.diarra@gmail.com) via [pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)  
**To:** andy yi <[hy8196695@gmail.com](mailto:hy8196695@gmail.com)>  
**CC:** pqc-forum <[pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)>, gmax...@gmail.com <[gmaxwell@gmail.com](mailto:gmaxwell@gmail.com)>, Matthias Kannwischer <[m.kannwischer@gmail.com](mailto:m.kannwischer@gmail.com)>, Lorenz Panny <[lorenz@yx7.cc](mailto:lorenz@yx7.cc)>, abctot...@gmail.com <[abctothemars@gmail.com](mailto:abctothemars@gmail.com)>  
**Subject:** Re: [pqc-forum] Re: Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?  
**Date:** Thursday, July 07, 2022 11:18:04 PM ET

---

When & how is rainbow team planning to keep their word and pays up the 400,000\$ reward???

Abcmint has been trashed! Keep your word

On Fri, Jul 8, 2022, 09:42 andy yi <[hy8196695@gmail.com](mailto:hy8196695@gmail.com)> wrote:

Even so, I still think it is unique, because the algorithm parameters used in abc are directly provided by Professor Ding, which is different from other cryptocurrencies. It can upgrade the parameters, etc. Rainbow team After submitting the new parameters, abc can complete the upgrade. [https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/pqc-forum/c/6bJFzU\\_h44I](https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/pqc-forum/c/6bJFzU_h44I)

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flavors. With so many other knobs to twiddle that they usually leave the digital signature part alone.

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**From:** ToTheMars ABC <[abctothemars@gmail.com](mailto:abctothemars@gmail.com)> via [pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)  
**To:** pqc-forum <[pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)>  
**CC:** hy81...@gmail.com <[hy8196695@gmail.com](mailto:hy8196695@gmail.com)>, gmax...@gmail.com <[gmaxwell@gmail.com](mailto:gmaxwell@gmail.com)>, pqc-forum <[pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)>, Matthias Kannwischer <[m.kannwischer@gmail.com](mailto:m.kannwischer@gmail.com)>, Lorenz Panny <[lorenz@yx7.cc](mailto:lorenz@yx7.cc)>, ToTheMars ABC <[abctothemars@gmail.com](mailto:abctothemars@gmail.com)>  
**Subject:** Re: [pqc-forum] Re: Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?  
**Date:** Monday, July 11, 2022 05:29:15 AM ET

---

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**Subject:** Re: [pqc-forum] Re: Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?  
**Date:** Thursday, July 21, 2022 07:53:03 AM ET

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**Subject:** Re: [pqc-forum] Re: Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?  
**Date:** Thursday, July 21, 2022 08:29:23 AM ET

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[forum/CAMa6AcKH-%2B%3DQ73kXXnTnpXNmBa-J3OLiW8LfLY1Cq2e0B0\\_XCQ%40mail.gmail.com](forum/CAMa6AcKH-%2B%3DQ73kXXnTnpXNmBa-J3OLiW8LfLY1Cq2e0B0_XCQ%40mail.gmail.com).



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**Subject:** Re: [pqc-forum] Re: Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?  
**Date:** Thursday, July 21, 2022 09:16:38 AM ET

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[Mr. Liu Jin's twitter](#)

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**Subject:** Re: [pqc-forum] Re: Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?  
**Date:** Sunday, July 24, 2022 07:45:53 AM ET

---

if not scammer, why not keep your promise and pay the \$400,000?

>>>>> "Abc Chairman Liu Jin has said "Anyone who cracks Abc's rainbow signature will be awarded a \$400,000 bonus", have you heard of anyone getting it so far?"

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as has been pointed out before, the level-1 parameter sets of Rainbow are practically broken by <https://ia.cr/2022/214>.

This obviously also applies to the Rainbow(16,32,32,32) instance used in Abcmint.

We have successfully recovered the secret key corresponding to the public key with address 84cJso7keg6SHW4vbNVbXccimCZrz7WoESXTtw12b5UsWqmm5.

This address is one of the wealthiest on the chain with a balance of 9M ABC. There is only one address with a higher balance, but as it has no outgoing transactions, we don't know the public key.

The private key was recovered within a few hours of wall-clock time using a slightly tweaked version of Ward Beullens' attack software (which in turn makes use of Ruben Niederhagen's XL implementation).

The forged signature for the message

"There is no pot of gold at the end of the Rainbow." (ASCII)

is

"TqERiKoFpkDEOEUGrq2WfH/

XvTxP8dzbUxUpD1UyTUyLnVUaZcqW9IV+bTLluamWS+XVKFcslyHLnxNcjcnCA==" (Base64)

The Abcmint client does offer functionality to verify signatures like these, but the feature was apparently implemented incorrectly and only allows verifying messages signed with a private key in the user's own wallet. Thus, we instead publish code to verify this signature using the Abcmint codebase as well as our own Sage script:

<https://github.com/mkannwischer/breaking-abc>

We hope this clears up any remaining doubts about the applicability of the attack to the Abcmint blockchain. Please inform us how to collect the promised \$400,000.

Cheers,  
Lorenz and Matthias

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**Subject:** Re: [pgc-forum] Re: Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?  
**Date:** Monday, July 25, 2022 04:43:58 AM ET

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If you have any questions about abcmint being cracked, you can ask Jin Liu, the chairman of abcmint, and he will approve the authenticity of the crack instead of talking nonsense here. Here is Jin Liu's contact information:

<https://twitter.com/abcardo>

<https://twitter.com/amisrepresented>

<https://www.linkedin.com/in/liujinabcardo?trk=org-employees>

abcmint Project Official Website:

<http://www.abcmint.org>

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"There is no pot of gold at the end of the Rainbow." (ASCII)

is

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**From:** s zhang <[shezhangth@gmail.com](mailto:shezhangth@gmail.com)> via [pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)  
**To:** pqc-forum <[pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)>  
**CC:** abctot...@gmail.com <[abctothemars@gmail.com](mailto:abctothemars@gmail.com)>, bank...@gmail.com <[bankofbsc@gmail.com](mailto:bankofbsc@gmail.com)>, pqc-forum <[pqc-forum@list.nist.gov](mailto:pqc-forum@list.nist.gov)>, hy81...@gmail.com <[hy8196695@gmail.com](mailto:hy8196695@gmail.com)>, gmax...@gmail.com <[gmaxwell@gmail.com](mailto:gmaxwell@gmail.com)>, Matthias Kannwischer <[m.kannwischer@gmail.com](mailto:m.kannwischer@gmail.com)>, Lorenz Panny <[lorenz@yx7.cc](mailto:lorenz@yx7.cc)>  
**Subject:** Re: [pqc-forum] Re: Why rainbow Signature is the strongest cryptocurrency algorithm?  
**Date:** Friday, December 09, 2022 08:02:21 AM ET

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Rainbow Signature has been proven to be vulnerable by many parties, but even so, do you still believe that your project is secure? And that is, since the rainbow and abc are cracked, abc project party should not fulfill the promise to pay the \$400,000 cracking bonus? Finally, you ABC project related people should be appropriate to stop it, this is a forum to discuss the pqc algorithm, not you speculators speculate on their own project place.

在2022年7月25日星期一 UTC+8 16:43:43<[abctot...@gmail.com](mailto:abctot...@gmail.com)> 写道：

If you have any questions about abcmint being cracked, you can ask Jin Liu, the chairman of abcmint, and he will approve the authenticity of the crack instead of talking nonsense here. Here is Jin Liu's contact information:

<https://twitter.com/abcardo>

<https://twitter.com/amisrepresented>

<https://www.linkedin.com/in/liujinabcardo?trk=org-employees>

abcmint Project Official Website:

<http://www.abcmint.org>

在2022年7月24日星期日 UTC 11:45:44<[bank...@gmail.com](mailto:bank...@gmail.com)> 写道：

if not scammer, why not keep your promise and pay the \$400,000?

>>>>> "Abc Chairman Liu Jin has said "Anyone who cracks Abc's rainbow signature will be awarded a \$400,000 bonus", have you heard of anyone getting it so far?"

Dear ToTheMars ABC, dear all,

On Mon, 4 Jul 2022 at 18:05, ToTheMars ABC <[abctot...@gmail.com](mailto:abctot...@gmail.com)> wrote:

In response to your comment that "rainbow algorithm have also been cracked" Abc Chairman Liu Jin has said "Anyone who cracks Abc's rainbow signature will be awarded a \$400,000 bonus", have you heard of anyone getting it so far?

as has been pointed out before, the level-1 parameter sets of Rainbow are practically broken by <https://ia.cr/2022/214>.

This obviously also applies to the Rainbow(16,32,32,32) instance used in Abcmint.

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